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The international roles states play in world politics are bound up with the ways in which sovereignty is constructed within the
international system. While scholarship on sovereignty has recognized its social construction, and role research emphasizes
social interactions as shaping roles and role behaviors, little work has explored the relationship between sovereignty and
roles. Linking roles and sovereignty offers a distinct perspective on the social construction of sovereignty, providing a broad
conception of socialization, emphasizing agency, and bridging domestic politics and international relations. We develop the
concept of a “sovereignty–role nexus” through an examination of Brexit, revealing, through processes of role contestation
and role socialization, multiple and competing constructions of the nature and value of sovereignty. While Brexit is unique,
we suggest that these dynamics will affect other cases where states face role changes linked to sovereignty concerns.
Introduction
The UK’s exit from the European Union (Brexit) signals a
seismic shift in its foreign policy orientation toward Europe
and its roles as a regional and global actor. Although the full
scope of change in the UK’s foreign policy and its relation-
ship with Europe is not yet known, the Brexit referendum
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and withdrawal negotiations nevertheless initiated a signifi-
cant effort to abandon the UK’s role as an EU member. For
the UK, this role change involved deep concerns about the
nature and meaning of sovereignty, which can be conceived
as prevailing “norms of sovereignty.” These norms, we argue,
are foundational to states’ foreign policy roles. Norms of
sovereignty define what kinds of actors can hold a sovereign
role, what sorts of roles are available and legitimate to pur-
sue, and what sovereign powers they have for performing
other, substantive roles such as “great power,” “faithful ally,”
or “neutral.” Because enacting roles involves both domestic
contestation and international socialization around appro-
priate state behaviors, role-seeking is a social process that
can influence how sovereignty is constructed. Constructivist
research on sovereignty norms has examined the social na-
ture of sovereignty, and role theorists have explored the so-
cial construction of roles, yet there has been little attention
to the interplay between sovereignty norms and foreign pol-
icy roles. We address this gap by examining domestic and
international sovereignty–role dynamics revealed in Brexit.
We begin with a discussion of a role theory view of
sovereignty norms, noting key differences from construc-
tivist research on sovereignty before outlining four ways
norms of sovereignty and roles are connected. We argue that
role theory furthers our understanding of how sovereignty
in the international system can be constructed, both shaping
and being shaped by foreign policy roles and the broader
international role system. This highlights key difficulties the
UK has experienced in repositioning itself into an interna-
tional role that simultaneously meets its various domestic de-
sires for greater control, its international foreign policy am-
bitions, is acceptable to international actors, and comports
with prevailing sovereignty norms around anti-colonialism
and the liberal international order.
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Like many major international turning points involv-
ing multiple causes, contingencies, and conjunctions of
events (Lebow 2000), the Brexit referendum may have
been an unpredictable catalyst, but the subsequent pro-
cesses it launched give us an opportunity to contribute to
role change research by focusing on sovereignty dynamics.
Scholars have identified different types of role change
such as adaptation, learning, and identity transformation
(Harnisch, Frank, and Maull 2011b), the processes involved
(Thies 2013; Wehner and Thies 2014; Beneš and Harnisch
2015), and investigated different change and stability dy-
namics in various cases (e.g., Klose 2020; McCourt 2020;
Teles Faszendeiro 2020; Wehner 2020), including the UK
(e.g., Gaskarth 2014; McCourt 2014). Our approach con-
tributes to these efforts by focusing on role changes stem-
ming from sovereignty concerns. By connecting both con-
testation and socialization to sovereignty norms, we are able
to demonstrate how efforts to change roles can reverber-
ate, affecting multiple states as well as the international sys-
tem more broadly. We argue this generates some existen-
tial resistance to role changes, since they have the potential
to affect the larger normative context around sovereignty
upon which roles are built, prompting reactions from a
wide range of actors who themselves have little material
stake in an actor’s role change. Finally, role theory gives
us a distinct agent-based perspective on the construction
of international norms, while also suggesting how norms
of sovereignty can constrain role changes, particularly those
prompted by sovereignty as a central concern.
The Sovereignty–Role Nexus
First introduced to the study of international relations some
fifty years ago by Holsti (1970), role theory bridges levels of
analysis, structures and agents, and material, ideational, and
normative factors, providing a conceptually rich theoreti-
cal framework for understanding complex social processes
(Harnisch, Frank, and Maull 2011a; Thies and Breuning
2012). Role theory is sociological, drawing on the metaphor
of the theatre, with actors in a society playing roles, such as
“great power” and “bridge” (Holsti 1970). Rooted in sym-
bolic interactionism, roles are not static but instead are con-
structed through interactions between the actor (Ego) and
others (Alters). Actors may have their own conceptions of
roles they wish to play, but as roles are relational, they must
be socially negotiated. This involves Ego enacting a role and
Alters responding through altercasting, resulting in a so-
cialization process whereby Ego may adopt a mutually ac-
ceptable role. A role theory approach differs from realist
approaches that focus instead on whether states have the
objective capabilities to play certain roles (Blagden 2019).
For role theory, the “sovereign state” is itself a role that
comes with specific expectations for Ego and from Alters
(Barnett 1993; Thies 2013; Beasley and Kaarbo 2018). For
Ego to play a sovereign role, Alters must recognize it as a
legitimate actor to hold a sovereign role, and accept the
sovereign role as granting Ego an agreed set of sovereign
powers for enacting other roles. We see these as norms of
sovereignty—ideas that establish and set parameters for the
nature of agency and scope of acceptable behaviors for the
sovereign role within the international system. As Philpott ar-
gued, sovereignty norms establish what kind of “polity” is ca-
pable of holding sovereignty (e.g., empires, states), which
actors can become sovereign (e.g., former colonies, the
EU), and what powers sovereignty provides (e.g., signing
trade agreements, regulating immigration) (Philpott 1995,
2001). International society, through sovereignty norms, de-
fines agency for holding roles and constructs the legitimate
behaviors such actors can perform when enacting substan-
tive roles (e.g., “great power,” “neutral”). Different histori-
cal eras have entailed different sovereignty norms (Philpott
1995, 2001) with different notions of agency for role holding
and enactment, thereby affecting the types of roles that are
possible within the international system. In these ways, roles
can be viewed as “constructed repositories of sovereignty
within international society” (Beasley and Kaarbo 2018, 9);
playing the sovereign role is the behavioral expression of the
normative ideas of what sovereignty means.
There are numerous approaches to sovereignty (for
reviews, see Jackson 1990; Lake 2003; MacFarlane and
Sabanadze 2013), including constructivist accounts (see
Onuf 1991; Wendt 1992; Biersteker and Weber 1996).
Such accounts have challenged the functionalist view that
sovereignty is an achieved status and the realist view that
sovereignty is an objective characteristic of actors that has
a single meaning. Instead, constructivist approaches to
sovereignty argue that like anarchy, sovereignty is socially
constructed. While sovereignty can be generally understood
as an actor’s “externally recognized right to exercise final
authority over its affairs” (Biersteker and Weber 1996, 2),1
actors embedded in social systems have varying understand-
ings of what sovereignty means and how it is practiced.
Norms of sovereignty are a prominent feature of its social
construction and have been studied fairly extensively, fo-
cusing on military basing (Schmidt 2014), military interven-
tions (Ramos 2013), and regional (Coe 2015) and temporal
variations (MacFarlane and Sabanadze 2013).
A role theory approach to sovereignty, however, empha-
sizes both agency and behavior differently than approaches
focusing only on sovereignty norms, shedding new light on
dynamics involved in the construction of sovereignty. First,
role theory, with its roots in foreign policy analysis, em-
phasizes and interrogates the agency of states and other
political actors. States’ roles stem from a variety of agent-
based sources, such as material and ideological proper-
ties that shape states’ conceptions of their national roles.
Since states have agency in choosing and constructing their
roles, norms of sovereignty may be selected and even mod-
ified in pursuit of a particular role. Role theory also un-
packs agents’ domestic politics more explicitly than work on
the domestic politics of norms (e.g., Acharya 2004; Wiener
2007; Bloomfield and Scott 2016; Risse 2016). Role theory
does not assume a single state identity or national role con-
ception, instead allowing for vertical and horizontal role
contestation across various sites that potentially affect role-
playing and role change (Wehner and Thies 2014; Cantir
and Kaarbo 2016a). Since roles can be contested domes-
tically, sovereignty norms can also become part of domes-
tic debates about which roles should be pursued (inter-role
conflict) and the meaning of the sovereign role (intra-role
conflict) (for more on inter- and intra-role conflict, see Har-
nisch, Frank, and Maull 2011b; Hansel and Möller 2015).
In this way, sovereignty not only is constructed and has mul-
tiple meanings, but is contested as well. This contestation
at multiple levels of agency also means that norms may
not be internalized, as much of the constructivist work on
socialization assumes (Thies 2013). With this attention to
state agency, role theory bridges agents and normative struc-
tures as roles are “an important link between agent and
structure” (Barnett 1993, 272; see also Thies and Breuning
1 While we offer this as an illustrative definition, our empirical approach ex-








niversity of St Andrew
s Library user on 11 M
arch 2021
RYAN K. BEASLEY, JULIET KAARBO, AND KAI OPPERMANN 3
2012). This bridge is consistent with research emphasizing
domestic sources of foreign policy, and is especially rele-
vant to sovereignty construction, given sovereignty’s internal
(ultimate authority within a state’s territory) and external
(recognition of that authority) dimensions (Lake 2003).
Second, role theory offers a distinct and novel perspec-
tive on the construction of sovereignty with its behavioral
focus. As properties of agents rather than normative struc-
tures, roles are more directly connected to actors’ behav-
iors. Role theory sees norms as only one element of roles,
facilitating but not determining role behavior. As Biddle
(1986, 71) notes: “norms are said to provide merely a set
of broad imperatives within which the details of roles can be
worked out. Actual roles, then, are thought to reflect norms,
attitudes, contextual demands, negotiation, and the evolv-
ing definition of the situation as understood by the actors.”
Multiple norms of sovereignty could be incorporated into
a single role to help define expected behaviors, and roles
may also guide actors’ behaviors when norms of sovereignty
are contested, indeterminate, or uncertain in a given situa-
tion. Norms of sovereignty may be part of a broader suite
of factors affecting the enactment of roles, since role be-
havior may come not only from international normative
expectations, but also from role demands of the situation
and from other actors’ specific behavioral role expectations
(Walker 1992; Aggestam 2006). From a role theory perspec-
tive, socialization is broadly defined, going beyond socializ-
ing agents to norms and including socialization of role be-
haviors (Thies 2013).
These differences effectively position role theory for un-
derstanding the social construction of sovereignty when
states face sovereignty concerns. Since sovereignty norms
are a constitutive element of roles, they are an especially
significant feature of role change driven by sovereignty con-
cerns. In turn, role contestation and socialization processes
can engage with and potentially alter different norms of
sovereignty as a state attempts to change its role within
the international system. Role theory has already been con-
nected to the sovereign role (Barnett 1993; Thies 2012),
most directly through the concept of the sovereignty–role
nexus (Beasley and Kaarbo 2018). Through role behav-
iors by Ego and Alter(s), we can see the nexus between
sovereignty and roles in four different dynamics: (1) debates
over the value and meaning of the sovereign role, (2) link-
ing of sovereignty to specific substantive foreign policy roles
for both Ego and (3) Alters, and (4) challenges to prevail-
ing sovereignty norms within the international system. We
explain these dynamics and examine each of them in the
Brexit case.
The Brexit case—which for our purposes extends from
the Brexit referendum in June 2016 until the UK and EU
agreed a draft withdrawal agreement in October 2019—
offers particular advantages for developing the sovereignty–
role nexus. Brexit represents a significant role change for
the UK and thus activated both contestation and socializa-
tion. Because Brexit debates turned in good measure on “re-
gaining sovereignty” domestically and also involved the com-
plicated process of extricating Britain from EU treaties, it al-
lows us to effectively illustrate our theoretical development
of the sovereignty–role nexus at both domestic and interna-
tional levels. We do believe these dynamics are also evident
and important in other types of role changes, as we discuss
in our conclusions. We organize the case presentation along
the four dimensions of the sovereignty–role nexus to better
illustrate the different dynamics they involve.
Our empirical demonstration of these four dimensions
primarily consists of verbal statements and claims of high-
level decision-makers in the UK and internationally. In the
UK, we include views of the “Leave” and “Remain” sides
during the referendum, post-referendum government dis-
course and parliamentary debates, and voices from the de-
volved administrations in Scotland and Northern Ireland.
On the international level, our analysis mainly invokes state-
ments of states’ and international organizations’ representa-
tives who commented on post-Brexit UK role changes. Our
strong reliance on verbal evidence reflects that early indica-
tions of the sovereignty–role nexus in the Brexit case were
mostly discursive. To the extent possible, we complement
our analysis with behavioral evidence, including votes in par-
liament and court rulings in the UK as well international
behaviors of the UK and other international actors, for ex-
ample, at the UN.
This empirical strategy follows well-established practice
in role theory research, which often uses speech acts and
other actions of high-level actors to substantiate its argu-
ment (Breuning 2018). We do not, however, claim that these
are causally driving the role transformation and reactions
to it.2 Nor do we assume that speech acts necessarily re-
flect genuine views. Consistent with role theory, our analy-
sis shows discourses and behaviors constructing understand-
ings of role conceptions and expectations (Walker 1992;
Breuning 2011; Wehner and Thies 2014). We use the Brexit
case to demonstrate that contestation and socialization over
roles are underlying processes in the social construction of
sovereignty and involve prevailing and contested sovereignty
norms.
The Sovereignty–Role Nexus in Brexit
The decision to hold the Brexit referendum stemmed
from internal contestation over the UK’s European role
within the Conservative Party and rising support for the
UK Independence Party (UKIP) (Clarke, Goodwin, and
Whiteley 2017). During and after the referendum, domes-
tic debate focused on issues connected to sovereignty and
its relative value for Britain (Hobolt 2016; Auer 2017).
“Leavers,” led by right-leaning parties and populist senti-
ments, pushed for a British exit from the European stage
(a “Brexit stage right”), emphasizing the desire for Britain
to “take back control” from EU institutions. The Leave side
was primarily represented by UKIP and key Conservative
Party figures, although the Conservatives were divided over
Brexit. The Remain side was led by PM David Cameron
and supported by most representatives of the other po-
litical parties (for a detailed discussion of the Leave and
Remain sides, see Clarke, Goodwin, and Whiteley 2017).
Contestation continued through the 2017 national election
where PM Theresa May’s Conservatives lost their parliamen-
tary majority, with an electoral “backlash against the vote
for Brexit and direction of the Brexit process” (Heath and
Goodwin 2017, 350). After that, ongoing contestation over
Brexit in intra-party, intra-cabinet, parliamentary, and legal
arenas saw PM May being replaced by Boris Johnson and was
critical in triggering another general election in December
2019. This election returned an absolute Conservative ma-
jority, leading to the passing of a Brexit withdrawal agree-
ment in January 2020.
2 Our purpose is not to explain Brexit but instead to develop our theoretical
argument. Explanations of Brexit have focused, inter alia, on domestic political
drivers (e.g., Hobolt 2016), historical, sociological, normative, and legal contexts
(e.g., Gordon 2016; Wiener 2017), identity and performativity (e.g., Adler-Nissen,
Galpin, and Rosamond 2017), economic and cultural consequences of globaliza-
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External actors also weighed in on the possible roles the
UK could play post-Brexit with socialization efforts over-
whelmingly supporting the Remain side (Oliver 2016a).
Spokespersons for EU institutions, international organi-
zations, and many foreign governments made explicit
statements against Brexit, arguing that the UK would be
weaker outside the EU, that negotiations about the UK’s
post-Brexit relationships would not be straightforward, and
that Brexit would have negative economic consequences.
Exceptions were Donald Trump, first as presidential can-
didate and then as US president, who embraced Brexit
(Trump 2017a) and Russia, which reportedly supported
Brexit to capitalize on weakness it might bring to Britain
(Colson 2018). We next demonstrate how socialization and
contestation in the UK’s role change activated different and
contested constructions of sovereignty, which can be seen
through the four dynamics of the sovereignty–role nexus.
The Value, Meaning, and Location of Sovereignty
The first dynamic of the sovereignty–role nexus involves
debates about sovereignty and the sovereign role itself. If
sovereignty is a significant concern, there will be pressure
to clarify how sovereignty has been affected and how it re-
lates to any potential role changes Ego seeks. Debates about
changing the sovereign role may involve the degree of au-
tonomy sovereignty provides from outside interference, the
specific powers it entails for changing significant policies,
and where it is thought to reside domestically. Questions of
the value and purpose of sovereignty may also surface in role
socialization, as external actors advance substantive claims
about what playing the sovereign role implies.
Both contestation and socialization over having a
“more sovereign role” exposed different understandings of
sovereignty in the Brexit case (Auer 2017), as revealed in
public discourses. Although the UK is a sovereign state, the
Leave campaign argued that its sovereignty was constrained
and that outside the EU it would enjoy more sovereignty,
more independence, thus characterizing sovereignty as con-
tinuous, not dichotomous. The Conservative Party has long
been divided over the UK’s relationship with the EU around
issues pertaining to UK sovereignty (Wallace 1986; Oliver
2015). Sovereignty was also an overarching theme for the
Leave side, with its “take back control” slogan and its claim
that Brexit meant regaining control over the economy, se-
curity, and borders. One Leave poster put it bluntly: “Brexit:
A Chance to Bring Back Sovereignty,” and another poster
claimed: “We Want Our Country Back.” For prominent
Leave campaigner and subsequently Foreign Minister and
PM Johnson, a referendum vote to leave would be Britain’s
“independence day” (Independent 2016a).
Contestation revolved around specific policy issues di-
rectly connected to the UK’s sovereign powers, particularly
immigration and the economy (Auer 2017). The Leave
campaign built much of its case for Brexit on an anti-
immigration platform, arguing that the free movement
of people required with EU membership compromised
the UK’s ability to control its sovereign borders (Cum-
mings 2017). Economically, Leavers focused on money
flows to Brussels and on lost economic opportunities
of more free trade with non-EU states, while Remain-
ers touted the net economic benefits to EU membership,
including being part of a larger trading actor (Clarke,
Goodwin, and Whiteley 2017). Groups across the political
spectrum supported Brexit, including “hyper-globalists,”
anti-globalization groups, critics of the EU’s “democratic
deficit,” and nationalists/isolationists (so-called little Eng-
landers) (Adler-Nissen, Galpin, and Rosamond 2017;
Blagden 2017).
Although foreign policy did not figure very prominently
in the referendum, the two camps still articulated distin-
guishable views on the UK’s role in the international sys-
tem (Martill and Rogstad 2019). While the Leave side em-
phasized the powers (especially around immigration and
the economy) that sovereignty should provide, the Remain
side’s arguments emphasized what types of actors can be
sovereign. In an interdependent world, argued Remainers,
country-based notions of sovereignty are old-fashioned, and
the EU’s pooled sovereignty is a more modern conception
of power and authority. As PM Cameron argued, sovereignty
does not necessarily mean influence, and sovereignty after
Brexit would only provide an “illusion of power” (quoted in
Parker 2016). Implicit in these arguments is the belief that
sovereignty is less valued for smaller units, given interdepen-
dence. Indeed, one key theme for the Remain campaign was
that EU membership amplifies the UK’s capabilities and its
potential to have influence in the world (Cameron 2016a).
Remainers argued that pooled sovereignty is not necessarily
a restriction of sovereignty; consensual decision-making for
EU external actions means that the UK does not have to act
against its own preferences (Burnham 2016).
International responses to Brexit reflected the Remain
side’s view of sovereignty, with many actors asserting that the
EU membership role enhanced the UK’s weight as an inter-
national partner. New Zealand PM Key, for example, said:
“We certainly think it is a stronger position for Britain to
be in Europe” (NZ Herald 2016). German Finance Minister
Schäuble suggested that, given high interdependence be-
tween European economies, leaving the EU would weaken
the UK’s ability to play a sovereign role: “In the era of glob-
alisation, ‘splendid isolation’ is not a smart option” (Spiegel
2016). Similarly, MPs of the German Bundestag (in inter-
views, June 2017) strongly believed Brexit was an act of self-
demotion of the UK in international arenas and that the UK
would not even be able to play a middle power role.3 This
mirrors the Remain side’s conception of individual state
sovereignty as limited in an interdependent world. One EU
Brexit official even suggested “there is no such thing as a
sovereign country anymore … it is an illusion the Brits are
all chasing” (Barker 2018). President Obama (2016) stated
explicitly that EU membership “magnifies the power of the
UK. It doesn’t diminish it.” Leave’s reaction, however, was
focused on sovereignty as domestic control, with Boris John-
son labeling as hypocritical US suggestions that “we must
surrender control of so much of our democracy” (Johnson
2016a).
The only significant international support for the Leave
side came from Trump and Russia. While Putin’s position
may have been simply to gain power against a weakened UK
(Colson 2018), Trump’s position resonated with his “Amer-
ica First” agenda emphasizing the “founding principle of
sovereignty” (Trump 2017b) in foreign affairs. He suggested
Britain would be “better off without” the EU precisely be-
cause EU membership restricts Britain’s sovereignty on is-
sues such as migration (Reuters 2016a). Trump also praised
the “free and independent Britain” that emerged from its
decision to leave the EU (Trump 2017a). The US political
right more broadly saw Brexit as allowing the UK to act more
freely on the international stage and to offer more leader-
ship in transatlantic relations (Rees 2017). This stands in
3 Interviews were conducted between June 19 and 21, 2017, in Berlin and in-
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contrast to the views of US President Joe Biden who pre-
viously spoke out against Brexit as Vice President in the
Obama administration, warning against “reactionary politi-
cians and demagogues peddling xenophobia, nationalism,
and isolationism” (Politico 2016).
Brexit also became entangled with the question of inter-
nal sovereignty (Oliver 2015; Wiener 2017)—who in the UK
had the right to make this role change? Legal processes for
implementing Brexit became part of domestic role contesta-
tion with arguments about where sovereignty lies: in the “will
of the people,” in parliament, in devolved political authori-
ties, or in the central UK government. The May-led govern-
ment argued it alone had the executive privilege to trigger
Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon, which sets the EU exit
process in motion, but the Supreme Court ruled that Parlia-
ment had to be consulted, thereby limiting Executive power
(Guardian 2017a) and transferring the contestation process
to Parliament.
Sovereignty was a significant issue throughout the Brexit
parliamentary debates (Gordon 2016). While the House of
Commons voted overwhelmingly to back the government’s
European Union Bill, to trigger Article 50, many MPs did
so out of respect and deference to popular sovereignty,
as expressed in the Brexit referendum. Contestation be-
tween parliament and the government over sovereign con-
trol for enacting role change continued into 2017, as par-
liament delivered PM May a significant defeat by declaring
its right to have a “meaningful” vote on the final Brexit
deal (Guardian 2017b). PM May rejected calls across the
political spectrum to delegate control over Brexit back to
the people in a second referendum (May 2018a), even in
the face of repeated government defeats on its Brexit deal
(Reuters 2019). While PM Johnson secured a narrow par-
liamentary majority for a renegotiated withdrawal agree-
ment in October 2019, parliament subsequently voted down
the government timetable for implementing the agreement,
leading the government to pause legislation (BBC News
2019a). The deadlock between parliament and government
was only resolved through a general election in December
2019, which strengthened the hand of the Johnson-led gov-
ernment and finally enabled it to push its Brexit bill through
the House of Commons (BBC News 2020).
Sovereignty’s location was also contested across the UK’s
devolved political system (Keating 2019), as the four con-
stituent territories voted differently in the referendum (with
majorities in England and Wales favoring Brexit and ma-
jorities in Scotland and Northern Ireland opposed). Scot-
tish First Minister Sturgeon argued that Brexit should re-
quire majority support in each UK territory (McHarg and
Mitchell 2017). The UK government decidedly rejected this
or any opt-out or veto from Scotland (Telegraph 2016a). In
the 2017 UK Supreme Court Brexit case, “the various de-
volution submissions presented a … radical and pluralist vi-
sion of the location of constitutional authority within the
United Kingdom” (McHarg and Mitchell 2017, 521). The
Court ruled in favor of the central government but declined
to rule definitively on the status of the devolved units in the
actual withdrawal from EU laws. The Scottish government
continued to argue that each territory should have more in-
volvement in Brexit negotiations (The National 2018). As
for Northern Ireland, the small Democratic Unionist Party
led opposition to the “backstop” proposed in the EU–UK
withdrawal agreement, which it criticized as a threat to the
sovereign integrity of the UK, and used its pivotal position
in parliament, between the 2017 and 2019 general elections,
to thwart government attempts to secure a majority for the
agreement (Hayward and Vaughan 2019).
Seeking a more sovereign role revealed differing concep-
tions of the nature and location of sovereignty, with some
emphasizing domestic policy powers and the will of the peo-
ple, and others attempting to wrest control out of Whitehall
and into parliament or the devolved authorities. Some in
the international community focused on the advantages af-
forded by pooling sovereignty through the EU. In this way,
Brexit represented a role change that generated intense dis-
cursive and—to a lesser extent—behavioral contestation in-
volving the nature of sovereignty, which in turn became con-
nected to more specific foreign policy roles that sovereignty
might afford.
Casting and Socializing Foreign Policy Roles
The second dynamic of the sovereignty–role nexus involves
new substantive roles sought and available for Ego. What
potential foreign policy roles become accessible if more
sovereignty is acquired, and how well would they address
sovereignty concerns? Here, contestation involves domes-
tic actors putting forward different national role concep-
tions about substantive foreign policy roles (e.g., neutral
state, global leader). Because sovereignty in this way be-
comes part of the role location process, it is also a signifi-
cant factor in role socialization. As Ego explores new roles
that might address its sovereignty concerns, Alters will high-
light sovereignty issues for those roles. As with all role so-
cialization, Alters may accept, reject, or shape Ego’s roles in
accordance with Alters’ preferences (Thies 2013). If Alters
reject or seek to shape Ego’s roles, this may involve role con-
flict (Cantir and Kaarbo 2016b, 5) between Ego conceptions
and Alter expectations around what roles any post-Brexit
sovereignty gains allow the UK to play.
Leavers argued more sovereignty would give the UK
greater independence to play other substantive foreign pol-
icy roles. The UK government casted about for several
roles post-Brexit, including global trading state, great power,
leader of the Commonwealth, and faithful ally to the United
States. Each of these roles offers the UK different oppor-
tunities to exercise its post-Brexit sovereignty status and
each emphasized somewhat different aspects of sovereignty.
These were met by resistance from external actors challeng-
ing the notion that sovereignty permits their unilateral pur-
suit and involved inter-role conflict as not all roles cast for
were compatible with each other (Oppermann, Beasley, and
Kaarbo 2020).
The UK government projected two global roles—global
trading state and great power—and supported both with
rhetoric emphasizing sovereignty as affording great auton-
omy internationally. Brexit would free the UK from the
shackles of the EU and unleash the UK’s potential as a
global actor (Daddow 2019). PM May (2017a) argued that
the UK is “by instinct a great, global, trading nation.” Af-
ter Brexit, it will remain a “champion for free trade right
across the globe” (May 2018a) and become a “truly Global
Britain” (May 2017a). For the great power role, the UK gov-
ernment emphasized its “global reach and world class capa-
bility” (Williamson 2018), including its economic strength
(Johnson 2017), “unrivalled” soft power (May 2018b), and
its status as a permanent member of the UN Security Coun-
cil (May 2017b) and “a leading member of NATO” (May
2017c). PM May highlighted the UK’s great power capabili-
ties, arguing its new aircraft carriers “will transform the UK’s
ability to project power around the world” (May 2017c).
Government decisions to reinforce UK contributions to
NATO forces “on the ground” (Telegraph 2016b) and to
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Persian Gulf serve as behavioral evidence that underlines
UK ambitions to great power status (Williamson 2018). Simi-
larly, the UK re-opening of a naval support facility in Bahrain
was, according to FM Johnson, a signal that “Britain is back
East of Suez” (Johnson 2016b), reversing Britain’s Cold War
military disengagement from that part of the world, which
symbolized its retreat from a great power role (Self 2010).
Those arguing for these global roles characterized greater
sovereignty as greater power and autonomy, extending the
UK’s reach and global importance. Indeed, PM May argued
the referendum was “a vote to take control and make de-
cisions for ourselves and, crucially, to become even more
global and internationalist” (May 2017a), and “to reassert
our belief in a confident, sovereign and global Britain” (May
2017d).
These global roles met rhetorical and behavioral resis-
tance from many international actors who see “regaining
sovereignty” as an isolating and diminishing act that would
reveal the UK as a middle power for whom global roles
are unavailable (Oliver 2016b; Wilson and Oliver 2019). For
some, Brexit accelerates a longer term decline in the UK’s
influence that has it moving from the “first team” to the
“reserve bench” in international politics (Niblett 2015, 10).
President of the European Commission Juncker warned that
the “UK will have to get used to being regarded as a third-
party state” (Financial Times 2016a). US President Obama
(2016) cautioned that the “UK is going to be in the back of
the queue” for trade deals. Indeed, major non-EU trading
partners of the UK have largely rebuffed British overtures to
secure bilateral trade commitments, at best offering to copy
and paste their trading relations with the EU. For example,
Japanese officials made clear that they prioritize free trade
negotiations with the EU over the UK (Guardian 2017c),
and a 2018 visit of FM Hunt to Beijing did not achieve tangi-
ble results on the UK’s post-Brexit trading relationship with
China (Hunt 2018). Moreover, Brexit was widely expected to
weaken the influence Britain exercises in the UN (Dee and
Smith 2017). Behaviorally, this expectation can be seen in
the UK’s failure to win support in the UN General Assembly
for its candidate as judge in the International Court of Jus-
tice (ICJ), leaving it without a judge for the first time in the
court’s history, which was described as “a humiliating blow to
British international prestige” (Guardian 2017d). Far from
enhancing its global roles, any gains in sovereignty Brexit
affords would unravel its global ties and reveal a weak and
isolated UK.
The UK has, however, actively tried to avoid the role of
isolate (Oliver 2016b). Since Leavers promised that Brexit
will enable the UK to play new and enhanced foreign pol-
icy roles after Brexit, this is central to the UK govern-
ment’s domestic and international credibility (see Teles
Faszendeiro 2020). Given that the isolate role contradicts
ingrained public and elite beliefs about the UK’s place
in the world (Gaskarth 2014, 566–69), resistance to be-
ing cast into this role post-Brexit may also involve efforts
at maintaining a stable identity (see Klose 2020). Thus,
Boris Johnson (quoted in Independent 2016b) drew “a very,
very strong contrast between Brexit and any kind of iso-
lationism” and PM May (2018b) emphasized that Brexit
“was not a rejection of multilateralism or international co-
operation.” For Trade Secretary Liam Fox (2017), Brexit
did not mean “the United Kingdom would be withdraw-
ing from the world stage.” Similarly, PM May (2017b) pro-
claimed: “We may be leaving the European Union but we
are not leaving Europe” and that relations with Europe
can be better pursued from the position of “a sovereign
nation in which the British people are in control.” Yet,
the widespread view among international observers was
that Brexit meant a “voyage to inglorious isolation” (New
York Times 2017) and an “isolationist catastrophe” (Los
Angeles Times 2016).
The UK’s casting for leader of the Commonwealth role
also met with skepticism. The government foregrounded
the UK’s position as “a driving force in the Commonwealth”
(May 2018a) with official visits to Commonwealth coun-
tries highlighting “common values among its members”
(Johnson 2017), and prioritizing trade relations (May
2017a). The Commonwealth role speaks to domestic con-
stituencies nostalgic for Britain’s imperial past (Turner
2019) but Commonwealth countries have not supported
this role, preferring a UK in the EU, or the EU, over
a Brexited UK (Guardian 2016a; Namusoke 2016). The
Secretary-General of the Commonwealth rejected as a “false
choice” suggestions that the UK’s Commonwealth links
should replace its EU membership (Reuters 2016b). More-
over, the role was criticized for its neocolonial connota-
tions (Guardian 2016a; Adler-Nissen, Galpin, and Rosa-
mond 2017) and was branded, by skeptical officials inside
Whitehall, as “Empire 2.0” (Civil Service World 2017). While
the leader of the Commonwealth role resonates with many
policymakers’ understandings of the UK’s long-term iden-
tity, it clashes with Commonwealth members’ own role con-
ceptions along sovereignty lines (see Klose 2020).
Faithful ally to the United States is another potential post-
Brexit UK role, but one that could transform sovereignty’s
independence into greater dependence on the United
States (Bew and Elefteriu 2016). The UK affirmed this “spe-
cial relationship” (Wilson 2017), with PM May (2017d) as-
serting: “we have the opportunity – indeed the respon-
sibility – to renew the special relationship for this new
age.” The Trump administration in the United States gen-
erally accepted this faithful ally role, at least rhetorically
(Guardian 2016b). Given his views on the importance of
state sovereignty, President Trump embraced the special re-
lationship, inviting PM May as his first official guest in Wash-
ington (Trump 2017a). Nevertheless, the US–UK relation-
ship was tested with trade disputes, Trump’s critiques about
the UK’s response to terrorism and PM May’s handling of
Brexit, and his comments on intra-party Conservative lead-
ership struggles (BBC News 2018; Sabbagh 2018). The faith-
ful ally role is also contested domestically in the UK, given
the high political price the UK pays for sustaining it, not
least in terms of—at times unpopular—diplomatic and mil-
itary support for the United States (Porter 2010).
Overall, early international reactions to Brexit challenge
the UK’s ability to translate its sovereignty into the substan-
tive roles it seeks, highlighting different constructions of
sovereignty in relation to various possible UK roles. While
sovereignty may grant the right to negotiate trade deals,
project power, or exploit cultural ties, it does not confer
trading partners, provide material capabilities, or regain
historical status. Domestic visions of sovereignty as greater
control crash headlong into international conceptions of a
weakened and isolated UK becoming more reliant on its spe-
cial relationship with the United States and becoming even
less special among the Commonwealth.
Implications for Alters’ Roles
The third dynamic of the sovereignty–role nexus involves
how role change in Ego affects Alter(s)’ roles. As roles
are relational, any change in Ego’s roles can impact Al-
ters’ roles, and contestation and socialization may turn
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changes arising from sovereignty concerns may have dis-
tinct sovereignty implications for others. Concerns with
such implications in Alters can lead to sovereignty-based
role conflicts between Ego and Alter. Alters’ socialization ef-
forts towards Ego can also reverberate onto their own roles,
prompting domestic contestation about where sovereignty
resides and the meaning and construction of sovereignty
for Alters’ roles. This should be particularly true for Alters
who themselves are already facing sovereignty concerns.
Ireland’s role vis-à-vis the UK and particularly Northern
Ireland may change with Brexit. This change is largely un-
wanted by the Irish government and is one reason for its op-
position to Brexit. A vexing problem in Brexit negotiations
was the border between Northern Ireland and the EU mem-
ber state Republic of Ireland, and the status of Northern Ire-
land as part of the Republic or part of the UK implicates the
UK and Ireland’s sovereign boundaries. The Belfast/Good
Friday Agreement not only established the way in which
Northern Ireland would be governed, but also dealt directly
with relations between the Republic of Ireland and the UK.
As such, the Brexit border problem has reignited differ-
ing sovereignty claims, and various proposed solutions to
the movement of people and goods each run into difficul-
ties along these lines (Guardian 2017e; Doyle and Connolly
2019).
The UK government’s position was that there can be no
return to a “hard border” between the Republic and North-
ern Ireland, but the EU demanded that the border issue be
resolved before other Brexit trade negotiations continued
and accused the UK of “magical thinking” with regard to its
hope for an “invisible border” (Guardian 2017f). The EU
insisted on a “backstop” as a fallback position that would
keep Northern Ireland inside the customs union and thus
prevent a “hard border” if the UK and the EU failed to
reach a comprehensive customs and free trade agreement
(Reuters 2018). While the UK government under PM May
reluctantly signed up to this idea in principle, it demanded
that any “backstop” must only be temporary and UK-wide,
arguing that otherwise it “threatens the integrity of our
United Kingdom” (May 2018c). PM Johnson, in contrast,
negotiated the “backstop” out of the withdrawal agreement,
at the cost of a customs border between Northern Ireland
and the rest of the UK (Haverty 2019). Because of these
sovereignty concerns, Brexit put considerable uncertainty
on the Republic of Ireland’s role vis-à-vis the EU and the
UK and on the sovereign borders of Ireland and the UK.
Given majority support in Scotland for remaining in
the EU, the question of a Scottish sovereign role—as
was raised through the 2014 independence referendum—
resurfaced with Brexit. The Scottish government, led by
the pro-independence Scottish National Party (SNP), raised
the question of another independence referendum im-
mediately following the Brexit referendum (Independent
2017). PMs May and Johnson rejected the call, but an-
other independence referendum remains a possibility, in
particular after the strong SNP result in the 2019 na-
tional election. Scotland’s First Minister Sturgeon’s warn-
ings of the “catastrophic prospect” (Guardian 2018) of
a no-deal scenario, her demand that Scotland and the
whole of the UK remain in the single market, and her
objections against any preferential treatment of Northern
Ireland all seemed to prepare the ground for another ref-
erendum (Politico 2018a). Scottish independence would
be another sovereignty-related role transformation resulting
from Brexit, affecting the UK’s sovereignty and its ability
to play other substantive foreign policy roles (Beasley and
Kaarbo 2018).
Brexit also has various repercussions for the EU. It im-
pacts power relationships in the EU Council, strengthen-
ing the roles of large EU members (most notably Germany,
France, and Poland) at the expense of smaller member
states (such as Denmark, Ireland, and the Netherlands) who
have had close ties to the UK, often pursuing similar pol-
icy positions based on shared concerns over EU sovereignty
(Huhe, Naurin, and Thomson 2017). In particular, Brexit
affects the roles France and Germany play in the EU (Krotz
and Schild 2018), pushing them together into a renewed
collective EU leadership role.
This can be seen in the EU–UK negotiations on the
post-Brexit relationship, in which Franco-German leader-
ship was essential in securing a common EU27 line that pri-
oritized defending the integrity of the EU’s internal market
(Oppermann, Beasley, and Kaarbo 2020, 141–42). In Ger-
many, Brexit reinvigorated a broad pro-European consensus
among mainstream parties, providing it with a new sense
of purpose. This enabled the Merkel government to lead
in formulating the EU27 response to Brexit (Oppermann
2019, 489–90). Interviewees in the German Bundestag in
June 2017 emphasized how Berlin became a key diplomatic
hub where positions of EU states were coordinated and how
the German government prioritized a close dialogue with
its French counterpart. This tied in with French President
Macron’s view of Brexit as a strategic opportunity to restore
Franco-German leadership in the post-Brexit EU (Reuters
2017). To that end, France worked toward a strong Franco-
German tandem in the Brexit process, hoping to win Ger-
man backing for its broader European initiatives, including
on European defense (Financial Times 2018). In this way,
Brexit, at least initially, revitalized the traditional Franco-
German “motor,” and thus the roles these states played in
the EU, at the heart of the European integration project.
Brexit also has implications for the EU as a global ac-
tor. Many worried that an EU minus the UK would be a
weaker power economically, militarily, and normatively (see
Blockmans and Emerson 2016). This was another reason
for international opposition to Brexit as some see the EU
as an important liberal, Western force to balance the rise
of other actors (Financial Times 2016b). Moreover, some
EU member states also face domestic conditions that may
involve role contestation and even role change. Although
Brexit may rekindle a sense of common purpose among
the EU-27 to reinforce pooled sovereignty and undermine
arguments by anti-EU parties across Europe (Adler-Nissen,
Galpin, and Rosamond 2017), the success of the Leave cam-
paign emboldened some anti-EU movements and political
parties in several member states, including France, Greece,
the Netherlands, Italy, and the Czech Republic (Hobolt
2016; Pirro, Taggart, and van Kessel 2018). Some fear Brexit
will reinforce anti-Europeanism and trigger “a domino ef-
fect that may eventually end in the break-up of the EU”
(France 24 2016). Consequently, the EU’s guiding principle
in the Brexit negotiations was that any post-Brexit arrange-
ments must discourage other EU members from following
the UK example and thus prevent further erosion of the EU,
its role in the world, and its notions of shared sovereignty
(Ries et al. 2017).
Broader Implications for the Sovereign System
The fourth dynamic of the sovereignty–role nexus involves
challenges to the prevailing norms of sovereignty within the
international society of states. Debates involving the value of
sovereignty and the types of roles it allows in both Ego and
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norms of sovereignty, at regional or global levels. Con-
testation and socialization may involve existential resistance
to role change in Ego by Alters if such change is seen to
threaten the fabric of international society, and internal and
external actors with a stake in the status quo may mobilize to
resist role transformation (Armstrong 1993; Jackson 1999),
appealing to the importance of established sovereignty
norms.
In Brexit, we see these broader implications surface
around two significant normative changes in sovereignty:
decolonization and the European liberal project. The pro-
sovereignty, right-to-rule-oneself message associated with
Brexit has been employed by some to further sovereignty
claims and advance anti-colonialist sovereignty norms. In-
deed, there have been sovereignty skirmishes prompted by the
UK’s role transformation, involving lingering unresolved
sovereignty questions facing the UK.
The status of Gibraltar was thrown into question when
its residents voted overwhelmingly to remain in the EU
(McHarg and Mitchell 2017), but nevertheless strongly pre-
fer UK rather than Spanish control of their territory. Spain
initially exploited Gibraltar’s disputed sovereignty status in
the EU negotiating position on Brexit, attempting to give
Spain the ability to exclude Gibraltar from future EU–UK
trade. A senior UK source noted that “the clause was ex-
traordinary because it effectively signalled a lack of total
British sovereignty over Gibraltar” (Guardian 2017g). Sub-
sequently, the Spanish government backed down on Gibral-
tar, but also signaled, in a change of position, that Spain
would not veto Scottish EU membership should Scotland
gain independence (Guardian 2017h). In Brexit-related EU
legislation regarding UK citizen travel to EU countries,
Spain’s insertion referred to Gibraltar as “a colony of
the British crown,” furthering tensions in this 300-year-old
dispute (Boffey 2019). Spain also floated ideas of joint
sovereignty over Gibraltar. Gibraltar’s First Minister, how-
ever, rejected this idea, saying “if anyone in Spain … be-
lieves we will ever compromise our sovereignty, they are
wrong. The concept of joint sovereignty or any dilution of
our sovereignty is a dead duck” (Nayler 2019).
Other instances involve sovereign claims over the legal
status of the Chagos Islands, and Argentina’s claims over
the Falkland/Malvinas Islands. Former British colony Mau-
ritius introduced a UN resolution to refer the dispute over
the Chagos Islands to the ICJ in 2017. Unexpectedly, most
EU member states abstained rather than support the UK, as
they had done previously. The ICJ ruled that the UK’s occu-
pation is illegal and ordered the UK to return sovereignty
over the islands to Mauritius (Guardian 2019), and the
UN General Assembly passed a similar non-binding reso-
lution, with most EU states abstaining or not supporting
the UK, sending a clear message regarding Britain’s colo-
nial legacy and continued sovereignty claims (BBC News
2019b). Similarly, Argentina speculated that Brexit might
cost Britain EU members’ support in its dispute over the
Falklands/Malvinas Islands, with the Foreign Minister assert-
ing that Argentina stands ready to use Brexit to “enhance”
its sovereignty claims over the islands (Politico 2018b). In
1982 during the Argentinian–British conflict over the is-
lands, the UK had been able to successfully cast its actions as
part of a status-quo power role rather than a colonial power
role (McCourt 2011). The Brexit landscape, however, has
allowed external actors to paint ongoing British sovereignty
problems with the brush of its colonial past.
The UK’s 2017 loss of a judge position on the ICJ
is another instance where the UK’s colonial role was in-
voked, with Indian newspapers comparing “Britain’s be-
haviour to its old commander in chief of British India”
(BBC News 2017). An Iranian reaction to Brexit directly in-
voked UK colonialism, as Iran’s Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces claimed: “England should pay the price of years of
imperialism” and that Brexit would prompt payment in the
form of dissolution of the UK state (Guardian 2016b). The
UK’s historical role as a colonial power is clearly relevant
to the sovereignty–role nexus, with several actors offering a
full-throated rejection of previous international sovereignty
norms that legitimized colonialism (Philpott 1995, 2001).
These reactions to Brexit involve others invoking this his-
torical role to discredit any behaviors associated with this
negatively perceived sovereignty norm.
Many interpreted Brexit as a reassertion of sovereignty in
the EU (Wilson and Oliver 2019) and a dangerous prece-
dent for further European disintegration, putting the “Eu-
ropean project” itself at risk. PM Cameron warned of Euro-
pean conflict if the EU disintegrated, saying “The European
Union has helped reconcile countries which were once at
each others’ throats for decades. Britain has a fundamen-
tal national interest in maintaining common purpose in Eu-
rope to avoid future conflict between European countries”
(Cameron 2016b). Pope Francis was among many who wor-
ried that Brexit might prompt a “Balkanization” of Europe
(Manila Times 2016). Auer (2017, 44), in his analysis of
debates over EU sovereignty in Brexit, argues that “Brexit
marks a serious setback to the ideal of a borderless Europe.”
Others saw Brexit as an opportunity for EU revitalization
(Adler-Nissen, Galpin, and Rosamond 2017), not least in
the area of security and defense (Martill and Sus 2018).
For European Commission President Juncker (2017), Brexit
put the “wind … back in Europe’s sails.” Junker proposed
that the EU should “catch the wind” to further integrate
around the Eurozone and the Schengen system: “We will
advance, we must advance because Brexit is not every-
thing. Because Brexit is not the future of Europe.” Beyond
stimulating renewed emphasis on European integration,
Brexit highlighted the revolution in sovereignty norms rep-
resented by the EU project itself—that a supranational en-
tity can hold sovereignty. French President Macron (2017)
emphasized this point by detailing six keys to strengthening
“a sovereign Europe.” Whether Brexit will generate disin-
tegration or integration is unclear, but that it has activated
debates about pooled sovereignty and the regional system of
European states is most evident.
The question of EU integration has a temporal-role di-
mension, as “… the historical self may play the role of
the significant other” (Beneš and Harnisch 2015, 151;
Wehner 2020). If Germany’s civilian power role once rep-
resented a rejection of Germany’s negative historical self
in favor of anti-nationalist European institutions (Maull
2000), Brexit is much the opposite, with supporters pur-
suing a positive historical self and celebrating nationalism
through de-institutionalization from the EU. Britain’s his-
toric great power role prescribes seeking more sovereignty
in the present, but internationally this was seen as tempo-
rally anachronistic among the Commonwealth and former
subjects, with its counter-normative proximity to colonial-
era norms of sovereignty.
Brexit has also been interpreted as threatening the
broader, post-WWII liberal world order (Walt 2016; Fisher
2018), a sort of “Brexi-stential” crisis challenging liberal
norms of sovereignty that encourage cooperation under
anarchy. This was reinforced with Trump’s election. As
Adler-Nissen, Galpin, and Rosamond (2017, 580) note:
“Trump argued that Brexit marked the beginning – or in-
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independence and identities.” Indeed, Trump (2017b)
called for “a great reawakening of nations” and a world of
“strong, sovereign nations,” in contrast to what he saw as
constrained sovereignty in the EU. This was another way
that the Brexit role change implicated broad sovereignty
norms within the international system.
Conclusions
US Secretary of State Acheson famously quipped in 1962
that “Great Britain has lost an empire and has not yet found
a role” (Briggs 2016). The year prior, the UK had applied
for EEC membership and was formally admitted more than
a decade later. The UK played this EU member role for over
forty years until the Brexit referendum again placed it into
a profoundly uncertain international position. This “Brexit
stage right,” partly driven by the political right and populist
sentiments and resisted by status quo-oriented international
actors, has not yet reached its final act, as complex negotia-
tions continue.
Not only is the UK government, as McHarg and Mitchell
(2017, 520) argue, “caught in a classic two-level game, nego-
tiating with competing domestic demands … and conduct-
ing negotiations with the EU27,” the sovereignty–role nexus
framework developed here sees it in a “two-level sovereignty
game,” wherein domestic and international conceptions of
and concerns about sovereignty are simultaneously negoti-
ated through role location. This creates challenges for the
UK as it seeks a role change that satisfies domestic desires
for more control while avoiding isolationism, is accepted
by key international actors, and fits prominent norms of
sovereignty consistent with both the liberal international or-
der and anti-colonialism.
Role changes involving sovereignty concerns may be met
with widespread skepticism for several reasons, hindering
the translation of greater sovereignty into substantive for-
eign policy roles. Alters may resist Ego’s role change if it
challenges their own conceptions of, and commitments
to, sovereignty. In the Brexit case, we saw this in reactions
from the EU and key member states (such as Germany and
France) and Brexit’s perceived threat to pooled sovereignty
and the European order. Others (such as Trump in the
Brexit case), however, may support the role change because
it advances their state-based conceptions of sovereignty.
Resistance may also come from Alters who themselves face
significant sovereignty concerns and may be particularly
affected. These concerns may be with internal groups
(as several European governments also faced Euroskeptic
and populist opposition) or with their own sovereign roles
and borders (such as Ireland’s relationship with Northern
Ireland).
More generally, these role changes may encounter exis-
tential resistance, since they have the potential to affect the
larger normative context around sovereignty, upon which
all roles are built. This may activate contestation and so-
cialization across a wide range of actors who themselves
have little material stake in Ego’s role change. Reactions
to Brexit invoked norms of sovereignty, with some actors
emphasizing the value of existing norms around pooled
sovereignty and liberal order, and others, such as India and
Mauritius, stressing the negative value of previous colonial
norms. Both anti-colonial and pooled sovereignty norms are
key “revolutions in sovereignty” (Philpott 1995, 2001) and
the UK has uniquely struggled around both of these ow-
ing to its history as a colonial power and its late and par-
tial commitments to European integration (Wallace 1986).
Prevailing norms of sovereignty may be used as a disci-
plining tool, restricting role changes that venture too near
to sacred sovereignty norms (anti-colonialism) or too far
from prevailing sovereignty trends (liberal order/European
integration). The disciplining mechanisms reside in the
processes of role socialization, which may take the form
of “sovereignty skirmishes.” Lingering questions about the
sovereign status of Gibraltar and the Chagos Islands, poten-
tial Scottish independence, and the UK’s lost position on
the ICJ are examples from the Brexit case.
While Brexit is unique, the sovereignty–role nexus may
be evident in other cases of role change. Novice states, for
example, are a specific class for role socialization, as Thies
(2013) has argued for the cases of early US and Israeli
statehood. Beasley and Kaarbo (2018) extended this to as-
pirant states such as Scotland, arguing that novice and as-
pirant states are socialized into sovereignty and their new
sovereign roles. Four other types of states may also experi-
ence sovereignty-related role changes.
First, postcolonial states emerged as part of a revolution
in sovereignty norms and must balance their independent
foreign policy roles against historical ties to former coloniz-
ers (Hansel and Möller 2015; Thies 2017). Given the signif-
icant impact of decolonization on the size and character of
the international system, understanding the relationship be-
tween sovereignty and role-taking may lend insights into this
global transformation. Second, defeated and highly depen-
dent states, such as postwar Japan and Germany, Ukraine,
and Chile, struggle to define and change their roles due
to constraints on sovereignty placed by others (Chafetz,
Abramson, and Grillot 1996; Brummer and Thies 2015;
Hirata 2016; Wehner 2016). The ways such roles are shaped
may reveal how dominant actors exercise power directly
through the construction of sovereignty. Third, small states
seeking role transformations face difficulties given that
state size is related to conceptions of sovereignty (Gigleux
2016; Breuning 2018). Small states also frequently form
through the dissolution of another sovereign state (In-
gebritsen, Neumann, and Gstöhl 2012), potentially offer-
ing insights into the parallel construction of sovereignty
and roles in relation to their parent state. Finally, states’
decisions to seek new roles by joining or leaving interna-
tional organizations and formal alliances will often involve
fundamental questions of sovereignty, such as Switzerland
joining the UN (De Vore and Stähli 2011), France leav-
ing NATO’s integrated military command in 1966 (Krotz
2015), and Mexico’s signing of NAFTA (Below 2015). The
perspective we have developed points future research to-
ward examining the connection between internal contes-
tation and external socialization in these types of role
change.
Consistent with those who assert that role theory can
bridge agents and structures (Barnett 1993; Thies and
Breuning 2012), we have argued that states’ roles and
sovereignty are interwoven. Sovereignty norms within the
international system at any given time shape what sorts of
actors can hold sovereign roles, what powers they have to
enact different roles, and what sorts of roles are available
and legitimate to pursue. Role theory, in turn, gives us a
distinct foreign policy perspective on the construction of
international norms. Compared to other constructivist ap-
proaches to sovereignty, a role theory perspective empha-
sizes agency as actors seek to employ and contest differ-
ent norms of sovereignty in order to adopt particular roles.
Because roles incorporate sovereignty norms to prescribe
and guide appropriate role behaviors, we can also see the
social construction of sovereignty through the altercasting
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nuanced understanding of how sovereignty is constructed
and how this shapes roles, intra- and inter-role conflicts, and
the international role system. All of these aspects were evi-
dent and important in the Brexit case.
We have not set out to understand exactly how, or
whether, the social constructions of sovereignty may have
changed for different actors. However, discourses did fre-
quently employ sovereignty in arguments about the na-
ture and value of role change, and the connection be-
tween sovereignty and roles was expressed in different ways
by different actors. When the dust settles, we suspect that
there may be some perceptible and potentially lasting con-
sequences for the way in which sovereignty is understood by
different actors, at the international, domestic, or even ev-
eryday level (de Carvalho, Schia, and Guillaume 2019). For
example, domestically, the contestation about the location
of sovereignty has exposed tensions between parliament,
government, and the public, and it has amplified frictions
in the UK constitutional settlement. Internationally, Brexit
has spawned clear affirmations of anti-colonialism, but it
is also a challenge to post-Westphalian notions of pooling
sovereignty beyond the nation-state and to the liberal order
itself.
Meanwhile, the arrival on the scene of US President
Biden adds a further twist to the Brexit story. A long-
standing critic of Brexit and its architects in the UK, Biden
has pledged to lead on defending the multilateral interna-
tional order and can be expected to resist the challenge
to liberal sovereignty norms that Brexit represents (Biden
2017). Biden’s early remarks, as President-elect, moreover,
suggest that he will make the UK’s faithful ally role, and
any prospect of a US–UK trade agreement, conditional
on the UK reaching a deal with the EU to avoid a hard
border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ire-
land (Economist 2020). The foreseeable shifts in US foreign
policy (Biden 2020) deprive Brexit supporters of their most
important international support, strengthen international
opposition against UK role changes envisioned by Brexit (in
particular in Ireland and the EU), and heighten the risks of
the UK being cast in the role of isolate. Brexit puts the UK
on a collision course with the role expectations of the Biden
administration, and the change in US government stands
to feed back into domestic UK debates about the value of
any sovereignty gained through Brexit. When the final cur-
tain falls, we may well see the UK in a new international role
on the world’s stage that will have lasting implications not
only for its foreign policy, but also for the rest of the EU
and others’ roles in the international system. In whatever
way this play concludes, Brexit’s plot weaves well the tangled
web of foreign policy roles and the social construction of
sovereignty.
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